Abstract-We consider a model-based threat assessment method, which enables the activation of assisting safety interventions in case an accident threat to the driver is detected. The method relies on vehicle and driver mathematical models and reachability analysis tools. In particular, we focus on the problem of false threats detection that can occur due to uncertainties in the driver model, i.e., the driver is incorrectly deemed incapable of accomplishing a driving task. This paper proposes a novel approach, to compensate for uncertainties in the driver model, for the considered threat assessment method. In particular, we show how the considered threat assessment method can be designed such that, if a threat is detected, the driver is guaranteed to be unable to perform the assigned driving task. In such case, an automated assisting intervention can be motivated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Active safety systems with autonomous driving capabilities are expected to contribute substantially to the safety of future transportation systems. In particular, increased safety standards are expected from the capability of semiautonomous safety systems of switching from a fully manual driving mode, where the driver has full control of the vehicle, to a fully autonomous driving mode, where the driver is overridden and the vehicle motion is controlled by an autonomous driving systems, in case a risk of accident is detected. It is then crucial that situations where the driver needs assistance are accurately assessed so that assisting interventions are activated only when needed. We refer to the problem of determining whether the driver needs of assistance as the threat assessment problem.
In [7] , we presented a model based threat assessment method, specifically evaluating the driver's ability in safely performing a desired maneuver. We first introduce a set of constraints describing "safe" driving. Moreover, we assume that estimates of the vehicle state and the road geometry are available over a future finite time horizon and exploit vehicle and driver modeling in order to predict future constraints violation, indicating the possibility of a lane departure or loss of vehicle control.
However, estimates of the vehicle state and the road geometry, as well as vehicle and driver's models, are very likely subject to uncertainties. Such uncertainties might lead to either activation of unnecessary automated interventions or missed interventions in situations when they are needed. In order to avoid nuisance, safety functions like, e.g., the rearend collision avoidance systems suppress interventions when operating under uncertainty, until it can be guaranteed that an intervention is needed to avoid or mitigate the accident [5] . In [1] , we modified the method in [7] to account for model parameter uncertainties in the threat assessment. In this paper, we refine our method by postponing assisting interventions until it can be guaranteed that the driver is unable to safely perform the assigned driving task. Results are provided that quantify the confidence of the threat assessment performed with the proposed method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide basic definitions and results on reachability analysis and set theory. In Section III we introduce definitions and results related to uncertainties in the model parameters. In Section IV, we present the vehicle and driver modeling used next in Section V, where a model based threat assessment algorithm is presented. In Section VI, we show how the threat assessment method can be modified to account for uncertainties, while in Section VII, we validate the proposed approaches using experimental data. Section VIII closes the paper with final remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce a few definitions and recall basic results on set theory and reachability analysis for constrained discretetime systems.
Definition 1:
. ., R N is a partition of Θ and theR i 's are polyhedral sets, whereR i denotes the closure of the set R i .
Definition 2: The Minkowski sum of two polytopes P and Q is a polytope, P ⊕ Q {p + q| p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}.
In this section we focus on nominal systems only, while modeling uncertainties are considered in Section III. Denote by f a the state update function of an autonomous discretetime system,
where x(t) denotes the state vector. For the autonomous system (1), we define the set of states that evolve to the set S in one step as,
In this paper we will focus on linear time-invariant discrete time systems subject to external disturbances. Hence, the state update function f a in (1) has the following linear form
where w is a bounded disturbance. We will consider polytopic sets S which can be represented as,
Hence, the set Pre fa (S) for the system (3) can be easily calculated as Pre (A,E) (S, w) {x ∈ R n |HAx ≤ K − HEw}, in case the disturbance w is known.
III. SYSTEMS WITH MODEL UNCERTAINTIES
In this paper we are interested in studying the backward reachable sets for systems with model uncertainties, where polytopic uncertainty is assumed. In particular, the following assumption is introduced on the matrices A, E in (3).
Assumption 1: A ∈ A and E ∈ E where,
(5) In this paper, the robust backward reachable set for the system (3), subject to model uncertainty in (5) , is defined as the set of initial states, which evolve to a specific target set for all admissible models, i.e., for all the pairs A ∈ A, E ∈ E. In particular, we define the robust reachable set w.r.t. model uncertainties as follows, Definition 3 (Robust backward reachable set): Denote by,
the set of initial states from which the system (3) evolves to S in one step ∀A ∈ A, E ∈ E. The set Pre (A,E) (S) is the largest set of states which can be guaranteed to be enclosed by Pre (A,E) (S), ∀A ∈ A, E ∈ E, under the Assumption 1. Although the computation of Pre (A,E) (S) through (6) requires an infinite number of set intersections, the calculation of the set Pre (A,E) (S) can be reduced to a finite number of operations, as stated by the following proposition. Proposition 1:
Pre (Ãi,Ẽi) (S).
The proof of Proposition 1 follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 2 in [10] for hybrid systems. Next we propose a definition of backward reachable set, for the uncertain system (3), (5) , which is alternative to the Definition 3. As explained next, such definition is relevant for the application considered in this paper.
In this paper, the uncertain backward reachable set for the system (3), subject to model uncertainty in (5) , is defined as the set of initial states, which evolve to a specific target set for some admissible model, i.e., for some pair A ∈ A, E ∈ E.
In particular, we define the uncertain backward reachable set as follows,
Definition 4 (Uncertain backward reachable set):
Denote by,
the set of initial states from which the system (3) evolves to S in one step for some pair A ∈ A, E ∈ E. The set Pre (A,E) U (S) is the smallest set of states which encloses Pre (A,E) (S) for some pair A ∈ A, E ∈ E, under Assumption 1. The relation (8) consists of an infinite number of polyhedral sets unions. Hence, in general, the set Pre (A,E) U (S) is not convex [3] . On the other hand, the convex hull Conv Pre (A,E) U (S) is the smallest convex set enclosing Pre (A,E) U (S). Proposition 1 states that, in order to calculate Pre (A,E) (S), it is sufficient to compute Pre (Ãi,Ẽi) (S), i = 1, . . . , N A , i.e., a finite number of backward reachable sets have to be computed for the vertices of A, E. In general, a result similar to Proposition 1 does not hold for (8) .
We are interested in finding a set that (i) encloses
is a polytope and (iii) computed through a finite number of evaluations. In order to to derive such result, it is convenient to introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let (Ā,Ē), be any pair of matrices such that A ∈ A,Ē ∈ E andĀ invertible. If S is a bounded set and,
there exists a bounded set B = {∆x | ∆x ≤ ∆x max }, ∆x max > 0, such that,
(10) A proof of Lemma 1 is provided in [2] . Lemma 1 implies that, 1) a bounded overapproximation of the set Pre (A,E) U (S) can be found and, 2) a measure that bounds the difference between the overapproximation and the true set Pre (A,E) U (S) can be obtained. The enabling condition (9) is merely a restriction on the set A, prescribing that the difference between A and any matrix A ∈ A can not be indefinitely large. We illustrate how Lemma 1 can be used to overapproximate Pre (A,E) U (S) with the following example.
Example 1: Consider the model uncertain system on the form (3), with
T } where,
and let S = {x |
(12) andĀ = 0.5Ã 1 + 0.5Ã 2 . In Figure 1 , PreĀ(S) is shown with a dashed line and Pre (A,E) U (S) is the white set. A hyperrectangle B, which can be used to bound Pre (A,E) U (S) has been computed using naive interval techniques [11] and is shown in black in Figure 1 . According to Lemma 1 an overapproximation of Pre (A,E) U (S) can be obtained as PreĀ(S) ⊕ B. The set PreĀ(S) ⊕ B is shown in gray in Figure 1 and clearly encloses Pre (A,E) U (S). We introduce the following sets.
Definition 5: (10) is a ∆x maxoverestimation of the set Pre (A,E) U (S). In general, we want to find the smallest ∆x max , or equivalently the smallest set B for which (10) can be used.
Even though the size of B can be influenced by the choice of the pair (Ā,Ē) and the method for computing the bound ∆x max , the result in Lemma 1 does not enable us to find an arbitrarily tight overapproximation of the set Pre (A,E) U (S). The result in Theorem 1, instead, allows calculating an over-approximation of Pre (A,E) U (S) with a prescribed accuracy ǫ req .
Theorem 1: LetB = {∆x | ∆x ≤ ǫ req }. For each ǫ req > 0, a polyhedral partition A 1 , . . . , A NP and E 1 , . . . , E NP of A and E exists such that,
whereĀ i ,Ē i are any pairs such thatĀ i ∈ A i ,Ē i ∈ E i and S is a bounded set. The superset (right hand side) in (13) is then an ǫ req -overestimation of Pre (A,E) U (S).
A proof of Theorem 1 is provided in [2] and the proof of Corollary 1 is a straightforward extension. The significance of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is that arbitrarily tight underand overestimations of the set Pre (A,E) U (S) are possible. This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
IV. MODELING
For the threat assessment algorithms presented in this paper we utilize a standard single-track linear vehicle model, Figure 1 , the overestimation of Pre (A,E) U (S) is tightened in this figure by partitioning A in four parts and making use of Theorem 1. The same color convention as in Figure 1 has been used. sketched in Figure 3 . We also use a driver mathematical model to represent the driver behavior. The models are presented in [7] and briefly reported here for completeness. For a given vehicle longitudinal speed v x , the vehicle model can be compactly written in the following form,
subj. to
where x = v y ,ψ, e ψ , e y T and w = ψ d , ∆ψ d T are the state and the disturbance vectors, respectively. v y denotes the lateral velocity,ψ is the turning rate, where ψ denotes the vehicle orientation w.r.t. the fixed global frame (X, Y ) in Figure 3 . e ψ and e y denote the vehicle orientation and position errors, respectively, w.r.t. the road centerline and ψ d is the desired vehicle orientation, i.e., the slope of the tangent to the curve Γ d in the point O. ∆ψ d is the change in desired vehicle orientation between the points O and the look ahead point in Figure 3 which depends on the look ahead time t lp .
In (14), the driver steering behavior has been modeled by,
where δ denotes the steering angle and K y , K ψ , and t lp , are parameters of the driver model. The driver model parameters are in general both driver and situation dependant and might be estimated online in a vehicle application. We also define a set of operating conditions, in the space of the states and disturbances of the system (14), corresponding to stable driving within the lane boundaries. The constraints on the vehicle position and slip angles can be written as,
where e yij , i ∈ {f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, denote the positions of the vehicle corners in the lane and α i , tire slip angles. We compactly rewrite the constraints as Hx ≤ h. For details on the modeling and simplifying assumptions the reader is referred to [7] .
V. SET-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT
We introduce the following assumptions on the disturbance signal w, Assumption 2: Every time instant t, the disturbance w(t) is known over a finite time horizon of N steps. Assumption 2 implies that the road geometry is known over a future time horizon. The sensing technologies used in, e.g., [6] , [8] , [4] can be used for this purpose.
We denote by X f eas the set of admissible states, X f eas = {x ∈ R 4 |Hx ≤ h}. Every time instant, we consider a terminal target set T ⊆ X f eas . Further details about the choice of T are provided in [7] .
Denote by W t = [w t , w t+1 , . . . , w t+N −1 ], the sequence of disturbance samples over the time horizon [t, t + N − 1] and by W t,i = [w t+i , . . . , w t+N −1 ] any sequence extracted from W t . We compute the sequence of states sets X t (W t ) = [X t , X t+1 , . . . , X t+N −1 ] as:
where f a denotes the right hand side of (14a). We call the set X t the safe set at time t. The calculation of the sequence X t (W t ) is performed every time step, based on the updated disturbance sequence W t . Moreover, if at the current time t the state of the system (14) belongs to the safe set X t , the system (14), i.e., the vehicle in closed loop with the driver, is expected to evolve to the set T in N steps, while satisfying the constraints (14b). The algorithm is outlined in detail in Algorithm 1.
VI. UNCERTAIN THREAT ASSESSMENT
Denote by X t,(A,E) the safe set at time t obtained through the recursion (17) where f a in (17) denotes the right hand side of (14a). Let
and
Algorithm 1: Input: Current state x(t), target set T , sequence of disturbances W t , state update mapping f a = (A, E), the constraints matrices (H, h) Output: The safe set X t at the current time t, safe flag Saf e 1 let X t+N = T ,
if X t+i (W t,i ) = ∅ then Saf e = 0, EXIT, end 8 end 9 if x(t) ∈ X t then Saf e = 1, 10 else Saf e = 0, end 11 
EXIT.
denote the robust and uncertain safe sets at time t, respectively. Replacing X t in step 9 of Algorithm 1 by the set X t,(A,E) , then gives an algorithm which, for the assumed models, guarantees the detection of a constraint violation within N -steps. As a consequence this might however also lead to an increased frequency of false threat detection. Replacing X t with X t,(A,E) U instead, guarantees that, according to the assumed models, no false threat detections occur. The cost of such a guarantee is however that this might at the same time decrease the capability of detecting accident risk.
We recall that due to the infinite union in the right hand side of (19) it is in practice difficult to find X t,(A,E) U . Nevertheless, by repeated use of the results in Corollary 1 we can find an arbitrarily accurate ǫ-underestimation as,
We remark that even though ǫ can be made arbitrarily small, the guarantee that no false risk detections occur will be lost when using U ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ) instead of X t,(A,E) U . Such guarantee is however maintained if the ǫ-overestimation,
is used instead, where the index N inB N indicates that the influence of the horizon length has been accounted for. We note that in order to compute O ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ) the computationally expensive operation ⊕ needs to be performed. Checking whether x(t) ∈ O ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ) in step 9 of Algorithm 1 is Fig. 4 . Estimation of the driver model parameters Ky and K ψ . The denotes the estimated mean, the ellipse denotes the variance, the dashed tilted box denotes a polyhedral approximation K of the variance, the * denotes the vertices of K, the dash-dot line partitions K in the parts K 1 , . . . , K 4 and the symbol ⋄ denotes the gridpoints used to formĀ 1 , . . . ,Ā 4 and
equivalent to verifying that,
Using the condition (22) in order to set the flag Saf e = 1 in Algorithm 1 instead, will thus preserve the guarantee that no false threats are detected while avoiding the computationally expensive ⊕ operation.
VII. RESULTS
In this section, we validate the proposed approach of accounting for model parameter uncertainty using data that has been experimentally collected at a test track. We also compare the present method to the approaches presented in [7] , [1] . In particular, we evaluate the effect of accounting for uncertainty in the parameters of the driver model, K y and K ψ . These parameters have been estimated based on the observed driver behavior using a recursive nonlinear least squares method [9] . The estimation algorithm updates the mean and variance of the parameters K y and K ψ as new data becomes available. Figure 4 depicts an ellipsoidal set, defined by the estimated covariance matrix, where the uncertain parameters K y and K ψ lie. Every time step we approximate the ellipsoidal set in Figure 4 as a polyhedral set K. Figure 4 , shows an example where only four vertices have been used for the polyhedral approximation. A more accurate approximation can of course be obtained by increasing the number of vertices.
Let the pairÃ i ,Ẽ i be the matrices in (14), where the values of K y and K ψ are set by their corresponding values at vertex i of K and with values of the rest of the parameters according to Table I. In the following results, the set K is 
• , e ymax = 1.56m, N = 10, T s = 50ms, T = X f eas .
In Algorithm 1, which does not account for any uncertainty in the parameters, we use the estimated mean of the parameters K y , K ψ and t lp . We also introduce Algorithms 2 and 3, where we use the estimated mean of t lp and treat the parameters K y and K ψ as uncertain. Algorithms 2 and 3 where first presented in [1] . Algorithm 2 is formed by replacing X t in step 9 of Algorithm 1 by the set X t,(A,E) . As noted in Section VI, Algorithm 2 thus guarantees that interventions are issued if a constraint violation is imminent for the estimated range of possible values of the driver parameters and is thus the safest approach. Algorithm 3 is instead formed by replacing X t in step 9 of Algorithm 1 with an approximation of the set X t,(A,E) U obtained as, (Ãi,Ẽi) . By using an approximation of X t,(A,E) U , Algorithm 3 aims at avoiding unnecessary interventions since it waits until approximately none of the driver models in the estimated range can avoid a constraint violation. From a nuisance point of view, Algorithm 3 might be preferable.
In practice, decisions to intervene will be issued at different time instances by the three algorithms. Of course, a difference in decisions between the algorithms does not necessarily imply that any of the algorithms decision is incorrect. In order to compare the algorithms we introduced a unified criteria in [1] for classifying interventions. Denote by t * a time instant where x exits the set X f eas and let
be a time interval where a decision to intervene is expected. We consider decisions to intervene that occur in a time interval T * as correct, decisions that occur prior to T * early interventions and decision that occur between T * and t * late interventions. Completely missed interventions are classified as late.
The performance of the three algorithms has been evaluated on approximately 20km of data and the results for ζ = 2 are shown in Table II . We observe that Algorithm 2 A∈A,E∈E X f eas,(A,E) , the gray set denotes Uǫ(X t,(A,E) U ) and the black sets denote B i + x(t), i = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The sets are cuts shown in the ey-e ψ space evaluated at the measured values of vy,ψ.
inspection of the late interventions, we have observed that, in all cases, the subsequent constraint violation consisted of a short drift out of the lane of less than 10 cm. Such constraint violations, are typically not very dangerous, but difficult to predict.
Obviously, Algorithm 3 overcomes a large portion of the nuisance problem associated to uncertainty in the model parameters. However, the approximation of the safe set used in Algorithm 3 is not guaranteed to enclose X t,(A,E) U , hence in general, an accident threat detected by Algorithm 3 does not guarantee that none of the considered values of the driver model parameters can avoid a constraint violation. We therefore consider Algorithm 4 in which the condition (22) has been used to set the flag Saf e = 1 instead. We recall that this condition ensures that no false threat detections occur for the considered range of driver model parameters.
For the computation of U ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ), a polyhedral partition K 1 , . . . , K 4 of the set K has been considered as illustrated in Figure 4 . The choice of matricesĀ 1 , . . . ,Ā 4 and E 1 , . . . ,Ē 4 is also commented in Figure 4 . Results obtained with Algorithm 4 are shown in Table II . We note that even though, Algorithm 3 is already performing well, Algorithm 4 reduces the number of early interventions without an increase in the late interventions. The results obtained using this limited dataset thus indicate that it might be beneficial to use Algorithm 4.
As an example of how the condition (22) is utilized in Algorithm 4 we have also provided Figures 5-6 . Figures 5-6 show the safe sets obtained in a situation that is particularly challenging. The vehicle is driving very close to the road border and might cross it very fast. The vehicle speed is however not so high that the vehicle dynamics prohibit the possibility to stay on the road. We note that in this situation x(t) / ∈ U ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ). However, since (x(t)+B N )∩ U ǫ (X t,(A,E) U ) = ∅, according to Algorithm 4, even though the vehicle is expected to violate constraints for some of the Figure 5 . The same color convention has been used. The sets are cuts shown in the vy-ψ space evaluated at the measured values of ey, e ψ admissible models, at least one might be capable of keeping the vehicle within X f eas . According to Algorithm 4, the situation should thus be considered safe and no intervention should be issued. This is in fact confirmed by the solid line, originating at the current state and showing the future trajectory of the vehicle over the horizon.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A novel threat assessment method which accounts for driver model uncertainty has been proposed. The method is designed such that, if a threat is detected, the driver is guaranteed to be unable to perform the assigned driving task. The preliminary results presented in this manuscript indicate that, compared to the previous approaches, the present approach reduces the risk of false threat detection while maintaining the ability to predict constraint violations.
